The authors make serious allegations, such as: ‘The Government was economical with the truth about the LGR, selective and inconsistent in its use of evidence, with the result that misleading impressions have been conveyed to local authorities, the public and parliament... [p.152].

The authors analysed the five criteria that were to be used in making decisions on the applications invited for unitary status. The letter to successful bidders implied these criteria were used by the secretary of state in making her decisions – but the criteria then stated were not exactly the same as those it said would be used in inviting applications. 

It is strange no explanation has been given for the changes. Originally, the criteria ‘must' be met. Later, they ‘should' be met. 

Originally, the proposals had to be supported by ‘a broad cross-section of partners and stakeholders'. Later, the word ‘broad' was left out. 

The authors conclude from these and other changes that the ‘goal-posts' had been shifted. More serious are claims that the Government misled local authorities, the public and parliament in presenting its conclusions on the financial savings from reorganisation. 

The chapter entitled ‘Dodgy data' points out that the Government said there would be recurrent savings of £75m from creating the first five unitary authorities. This figure is gross, and takes no account of recurrent costs. These costs were stated by the Government to be £20m, covering the expense of new local governance structures, including area organisations, seen as necessary for the new unitary authorities, which were to be much larger than the existing second tier. 

The Government appears to have accepted without challenge figures put forward by the authorities whose applications it was minded to accept for recurrent savings and costs, and for the transitional costs of effecting the change. The authors argue that these costs were unrealistically low, and the savings unrealistically high.

They point out that the additional costs of local governance, with its area structure, were very low in some cases compared with other cases. They argue that the recurrent costs should be £50m, making net savings only £25 million. 

The authors go on to challenge the savings figures, which include items which are ‘impossible to justify' as a benefit from reorganisation, such as a saving of £2.5m from home-working by members of staff in one county which, they argued, ‘had nothing to do with restructuring'. They also challenge the figures for transitional costs, showing that some authorities made no allowance for costs that others included, even where it was likely all authorities would incur such costs, as for recruitment, relocation and IT. 

The crux of the authors' case on recurrent savings and costs, and on transitional costs, is that CLG allegedly accepted the successful applicants' figures without rigorous appraisal. ‘Enough has been said to show, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the February/March examination of the financial cases by the CLG and the subsequent inquiries were a long way from being thorough' [p.70]. The inquiries were ‘superficial and very largely pointless'.

The book also analyses the use, by the Government, of evidence from the consultation process. It claims that the evidence from referendums and local polls was ignored or treated as less significant than the few direct responses from the general public. 

Thus, the views of 156,306 electors taking part in a referendum in one authority were treated as counter-balance by 149 direct responses. The book presents grave accusations. They are made by two academics of repute and standing whose arguments and analysis have to be seriously considered. The Government should make a response. 

There is a case to be answered because, if the authors are right, then the public and parliament have been misled. Doubt is thrown on the competence or honesty of the department in presenting information and argument. This case has implications for central-relations generally, since the Government should have presented its case with full, supporting argument and analysis.

The authors have done enough to justify an investigation by the CLG select committee, which would give the department an opportunity to respond to the charges that amount to allegations of incompetence or dishonesty – or both.

The CLG has been invited by The MJ to respond.

* Botched business. Douglas McLean Publishing, Coleford, 2008, £17.99. 

George Jones is emeritus professor of government at the LSE, and John Stewart is emeritus professor at INLOGOV